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RESEARCH AND REALITY: BETTER UNDERSTANDING
THE DEBATE BETWEEN SEQUENTIAL AND
SIMUL TANEOUS PHOTO ARRAYS
Frederick H. Bealefeld 111*

1. INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system seeks to protect the innocent and
convict the guilty. For nearly two centuries, scientists, academics,
law enforcement agencies, and others have worked to develop
methods to identify those who commit crimes. Driven by technology
and science, criminal justice professionals have made significant
strides in suspect identification systems over the past 150 years. This
article discusses the evolution of criminal identification systems in
law enforcement starting in the late 1800s in Europe. Additionally,
and more specifically, this article documents the history of the
Baltimore Police Department's eyewitness identification procedures
since 1983. It also discusses recent field studies and academic
research related to photographic lineup procedures.
History teaches us that identification systems are developed,
researched, and implemented only to be replaced by new and
improved systems years later.
Systems evolve as science,
technology, and research evolve; the goal, however, remains the
same: to protect the innocent and hold the guilty accountable. Law
enforcement agencies, throughout time, have based their decisions to
change or implement new identification systems based on their
commitment to this core principle.
II. THE FIRST CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
How could Bertillon have been so wrong? The son of recognized
physician, statistician, and anthropologist, Dr. Louis Bertillon, I
Alphonse must certainly have felt the pressure to succeed. Born in
Paris in the spring of 1853, Bertillon was twenty-six years old when

*
1.

Fonner Police Commissioner for the Baltimore Police Department.
Jim Fisher, Alphonse Bertillon: The Father of Criminal Identification, JIM FISHER:
THE OFFICIAL WEB SITE (Jan. 7, 2008) at I, http://jimfisher.edinboro.edul
forensicslbertillon I.html.
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he began his career in law enforcement. 2 Hired as an assistant clerk
in the criminal records office of the Paris Police Department, he
quickly set himself to the task of assisting in the identification of
criminals. 3 This was not an easy job since the department housed
over five million files including eighty thousand mug shots.4
Since the department lacked a coherent filing system or manner to
classify the personal data of criminals beyond their names, it was
nearly impossible to hold recidivists accountable for prior bad
conduct or to identify wanted persons. 5 This problem was hardly
unique to France; even famed Scotland Yard lacked a system of
criminal identification. 6 By the summer of 1879, Bertillon submitted
a report to the chief of police proposing a means to identify criminals
through a system of body measurements. 7 By combining several
different physical measurements he calculated that the probability of
finding two people exactly alike using these dimensions was over
four million to one. 8
While Bertillon was enthusiastic and convinced of the efficacy of
"anthropometry,,,9 a term he used to describe his system, police
leaders and detectives were skeptical. \0 Bertillon's proposals were
rebuffed several times and were not tested until a leadership change
within the department presented an opportunity. 11 In November of
1882, Bertillon was given the chance to prove his system through a
three-month field test. 12 He found his first match late in February of

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

Id.
Id. (noting Bertillon's enthusiasm for this employment opportunity despite the fact
that it essentially required the repetitive task of transferring arrest and criminal
background data onto standard forms).
Id.
Id. ("[Bertillon] noticed that arrestee physical descriptions were too general and
vague, and the mug shots, taken by indifferent commercial photographers, were of
low quality. Bertillon took note of the fact that many of the offenders, when posing
for their photographs, had intentionally distorted their faces to disguise their
appearances.").
Id.
Id. ("The fact the arrestee used another name would not fool the system which would
be based on physical characteristics rather than names.").
!d.
Id.
Id. (noting that, initially, police leaders thought Bertillon's system was "some kind of
joke" and a "pipe dream").
Id. (stating that the new police chief, Jean Camecasse, who allowed Bertillon to test
his system, considered himself a reformer).
ld.
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1883-an arrestee who had given a fictitious name several times. 13
Within a year, his team had identified three hundred recidivists
without encountering two people with the same body
measurements. 14 In December of 1884, the system was adopted by
the French prison system and became known as Bertillonage. 15
Detectives, while slow to embrace the system, were required to use
it and noted that while it was possible to take measurements from
prisoners in custody for identification purposes, the method could not
be adapted to identify suspects in the field. 16 Bertillon acknowledged
this deficiency and started using photography equipment to take
arrest photos.1 7 His practice of adding photographs to suspect
identification files, including profile shots, is a technique that remains
in practice today.
By 1885, Bertillon had become a celebrity in law enforcement
circles and his method was being studied by criminal justice
professionals in Great Britain and the United States. 18 "When,
therefore, in 1883, Bertillon announced an exact method of
identification by means of measurement he placed the entire world in
his debt." I 9 That same year he was called to assist in the
identification of an unidentified victim of a gunshot wound found
badly decomposed along the banks of the Marne. 20 Bertillon was
only able make five measurements, but those were enough to identify
the man. 21 Bertillon's identification ultimately enabled detectives to
identify the victim's killer and establish a motive for the crime. 22
Another case example where Bertillon's system was used involved
a French anarchist known as Ravacho1. 23 Following a series of
bombing attacks targeting judges and prosecutors in the spring of
1892, police suspected that Ravachol was responsible for the attacks,
and suspected that he was a common criminal whose real name was

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. (noting that the precision of Bertillon's identification induced the criminal to admit
that he was a repeat offender who had used aliases when arrested in the past).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Raymond B. Fosdick, The Passing of the Bertillon System of Identification, J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, May 1915-Mar. 1916, at 363, 364.
Fisher, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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Francois Koenigstein. 24 After an April bombing of an apartment
house, police apprehended Koenigstein, took his measurements,
compared them to a previous arrest, and pronounced that Koenigstein
and Ravachol were the same person. 25 At two separate trials,
Koenigstein maintained his innocence, claiming that he had been
mistakenly identified. 26 Only after being convicted of murder and
sentenced to death did he admit the dual identity. 27 The case was
reported in newspapers across Europe, further validating the
effectiveness of Bertillon's system. 28
Bertillon's system was used in thousands of cases with great
In England, Scotland Yard alone made 1,267
success. 29
identifications using Bertillon's system from 1898-1901. 30 The
implementation of "Bertillonage" spread to police departments and
prison systems around the world. 31 "England, Germany, Austria,
Russia, Switzerland, and several states in the United States had
applied it in their police departments, and the Bertillon cabinet
became the distinguishing mark of the modem police organization.,,32
In 1893, the National Chiefs of Police considered a resolution at their
convention proposing a national identification bureau in America. 33
The resolution was adopted, and Bertillonage became the primary
method of identification. 34 The Chicago Police Department agreed to
maintain the centralized criminal records repository and began
operations in 1897. 35
While the criminal justice community had become convinced of the
validity of Bertillon's system for identifying criminals, others
pursued different methods that they believed were superior. 36 In
1892, Francis Galton, an English biologist and physician, building off
of work done by Henry Faulds,37 a Scottish physician, published a

24.
25.

Jd.
Jd.

26.
27.

ld.
ld.

28.

Jd.

29.

ld.

30.

Fosdick, supra note 19, at 363,368.

31.
32.

ld. at 364.
ld.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
In 1880, Dr. Henry Faulds published his observations in the journal Nature, in which
he advanced the notion that because we have a series of ridged furrows on the tips of
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little known work entitled Finger Prints. 38 Galton concluded that
fingerprints would become a more efficient and effective manner of
criminal identification. 39 Galton formed a grouping structure for
basic patterns but had not solved the basic problem of how to
effectively file and search the print cards. Without a classification
system, the files would become a steadily increasing and
unmanageable collection of records in file cabinets.
One year later, Bertillon published the Textbook ofAnthropometry,
which described his identification methodologies and criticized the
use of fingerprinting as a sole means of identification. 40 He
dismissed the fingerprint system as crude, messy, and beyond the
ability ofthe ordinary police officer. 41
In 1894, investigators from the French War Office sought
Bertillon's assistance in a case of treason. 42 The army's intelligence
service investigators had received documents from a spy operating
inside the German Embassy, which were torn and of poor quality.43
The government agents assured Bertillon that these documents had
been authored by a captain in the French army, Alfred Dreyfus.44
Bertillon, who had once dismissed handwriting as having little value
in the identification of criminal suspects, agreed to compare the worn
documents to handwriting samples collected from Captain Dreyfus. 45
Bertillon concluded that the documents were written by Dreyfus in
such a manner as to appear not of his hand, essentially forging his
own handwriting. Bertillon testified to this handwriting identification
at tria1. 46
Dreyfus's attorneys presented testimony and analysis from their
own expert, a document examiner with the Bank of France, who
concluded that the document could have been written by a person
other than Dreyfus.47 While Bertillon had no qualification to make
his finding, he was viewed as an expert since he had invented the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

our fingers, the impressions these ridges leave on objects could be used in crime scene
investigations. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
HENRY T. F. RHODES, ALPHONSE BERTILLON: FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC DETECTION 178 &
n.l (1956); Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"science" of criminal identification and it was virtually impossible to
impeach his credibility.48 Based on the weight of Bertillon's
testimony, Dreyfus was convicted of treason and sentenced to life in
prison. 49
Ultimately, it came to light that Dreyfus had been framed. 50 The
controversy surrounding the investigation, trials, and ultimate
vindication of Dreyfus cannot be minimized. The case sent shock
waves across Europe, and many have ranked it the most significant
case of the nineteenth century.51 Bertillon's mistaken handwriting
identification was clear and wrapped in faulty science. He drew
incorrect conclusions that were not based on science, which resulted
in false testimony and the conviction of an innocent man. 52
Bertillon's notorious error likely accelerated the rapid ascent of a
rival identification system. In 1900, Edward Henry published
Classification and Uses of Fingerprints, which explained a system
that allowed fingerprints to be classified and filed, as well as quickly
and reliably searched. 53 The fact that fingerprints were an absolute
form of identification had long been established,54 and Henry
provided law enforcement agencies a means by which to use this
valuable tool. Scotland Yard adopted the system in 1901, and before
the end of the decade, most European and American criminal justice
systems had followed suit. 55
Until the time of his death in 1914, Bertillon remained convinced
that fingerprints were an inferior method of suspect identification. 56
Ironically, in that same year, France adopted fingerprints as the
standard method of criminal identification. 57 While the criminal
justice community recognized that there were conflicts and disparities
in Bertillon's system during the twenty years it was in use, it was the
best method available at the time. But the field of criminal
identification eventually evolved and left Bertillon's system behind.
48.
50.
51.

See RHODES, supra note 43, at 171, 173, 186; Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
See, e.g., RHODES, supra note 43, at 168; Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
See, e.g., Adam Gopnik, Trial of the Century: Revisiting the Dreyfus Affair, THE NEW

52.
53.
54.

YORKER
(Sept.
28,
2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2009/09/28/090928crbo_books_gopnik;
The Dreyfus Affair: 100 Years On, BBC NEWS (July 11, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.ukl
2/hi/europe/5166904.stm.
RHODES, supra note 43, at 185-86; Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.
E.R. HENRY, CLASSIFICATION AND USES OF FINGERPRINTS, at iii-iv (1900).
Fisher, supra note 1, at 2.

55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
See Fosdick, supra note 19, at 363.

49.
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III. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES**
At the start of the twentieth century, most law enforcement
agencies relied on live, in-person eyewitness identifications,
commonly known as showups. Following the report of a crime,
officers would typically canvass the surrounding area for the
person(s) matching the description provided by the victim or
witnesses. As police found person(s) who matched the description,
the victim or witness would be taken to view the suspect and make an
identification in the field. While the use of this form of suspect
identification may be operationally and investigatively expedient, it is
the most suggestive and vulnerable to court challenge.
The live lineup is a procedure through which the suspect is placed
in the company of several other persons of the same sex, race, and
similar physical features and shown to victims and witnesses. "A live
lineup provides an impression of height and build, allows the witness
to see lineup members from different angles and to see them
stationary and moving. Surely the availability of such cues will
inform the identification response in ways that the (static) photo array
cannot.,,58 This procedure was the most commonly used method of
suspect identification at the Baltimore Police Department for sixty
years because detectives believed that it worked. Special rooms were
constructed expressly for the purposes of conducting lineups.
Lighting, secured viewing areas, and prisoner holding rooms were
designed to maximize the efficiency of the procedure.
Conducting live lineups was manpower intensive. It was difficult
to locate a sufficient number of "fillers" (those individuals similar in
appearance to the suspect), and sometimes detectives paid people to
participate in the process. In extreme cases, plain clothes officers or
detectives served as fillers. The influence of the primary detective on
lineup composition and victim/witness cannot be discounted. Despite
the best efforts of detectives, victims and witnesses sometimes saw
the fillers prior to viewing the lineup, which would prejudice the
identification.
As crime increased59 and it became more difficult to manage and
present live lineups in Baltimore, technological advancements in
**
58.
59.

Most of the information in Part III is based on knowledge the author gained
throughout his more than thirty years of experience with the Baltimore Police
Department.
Neil Brewer & Matthew A. Palmer, Eyewitness Identification Tests, 15 LEGAL &
CRIMrNOLOGY PSYCHOL. 77, 81 (2010).
According to Federal Bureau of Investigation data contained in the Uniform Crime
Report, violent crime in Maryland increased from 4,691 incidents in 1960 to 24,512
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photography, film processing, and records management created an
alternative identification method. By 1970, detectives were creating
extensive files of arrest photographs (mug shots) to show to crime
victims and witnesses. The process of combing through hundreds of
mug shots was extraordinarily time consuming, and often fatigued the
witness to a degree that no identification could be made. Witnesses
commonly had to schedule appointments to view mug shots and time
delays may have dulled their recall.
In order to compose photo lineups, detectives worked to develop
the suspect's identity through sources of information, confidential
informants, and/or forensic evidence (usually latent fingerprints).
Detectives then performed a name search query either through
computerized records or through a hand search of indexes maintained
in the Identification Section of the Criminal Records Division. A
detective would then compare the data contained in those files-such
as date of birth, height, weight, last known address, and criminal
history-to the description of the suspect given by the victim and/or
witness. The detective then submitted a request to the photo lab for a
mug shot of the suspect.
Once the detective received the processed mug shot they would
draw on filler files (repositories of extra or duplicate copies of other
mug shots maintained by the detective, within the unit, or in the
Identification Section). These filler files were critically important in
the assembly of the photo array, and in most instances the detective
worked conscientiously to find five other similar photographs. This
effort was not confined to locating individuals with the same physical
characteristics, but also with the same exposure, perspective, and
time period.
Each of these factors presented challenges for detectives. Some
mug shots were overexposed, causing the image and background to
be very dark, others were underexposed, causing the image and
background to be very light. A number of factors could affect the
quality of the print, including a poor quality negative, defective light
source, contaminated processing solution, or compromised film.
Perspective could also affect the array.
incidents in 1970. Federal Bureau of Investigation, State-by-state and National Crime
Estimates by rear(s), UCRDATATOOL.GOV, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search!
Crime/StatelRunCrimeStatebyState.cfin (Select Maryland as the state in the "Choose
one or more state" category, select "Number of violent crimes" and "Violent crime
rates" in the "Choose one or more variable groups" category, select 1960 to 1970 for
the "Choose years to include" category, and then click "Get Table") (last visited Feb.
18, 2013); see also Maryland Crime Rates 1960-2011, DISASTER CENTER,
http://www.disastercenter.comlcrime/mdcrime.htm (last visited Jan. 30,20 \3).
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Arrestees were transported to the nearest police district. Each
police district had its own equipment for fingerprinting and
photographing prisoners. While efforts were made to standardize
each of the eleven facilities (there were nine police districts, with
separate locations for booking women and juveniles), for cameras,
lighting equipment, background, and film, subtle differences
emerged. For instance, cameras were placed at different distances
from the arrestee due to space considerations at the facilities. Some
of the photos showed the suspect from the neck to the top of the head
while in others the suspect's upper chest and shoulders were visible.
The manner used to memorialize the date and booking location
created differences in appearance. The photo board, a small black
box roughly the size of a sheet of notebook paper with moveable
numbers and letters, was used to record the arrest date, booking
location, and unique six digit identification number. In some
locations, the photo board was worn around the neck and supported
by a metal chain. In others, the board was held up at chest height by
the prisoner.
Over time, patterns emerged. Mug shots taken by booking crews in
the Southeast District differed noticeably from those taken in the
Central District. A very cursory examination of all eleven booking
stations would reveal a number of differences, even to an untrained
eye. However, it was not a conscious institutional effort to cast one
suspect as more sinister or highlight certain images over others. The
cadet who was assigned to separate the images by cutting the
negatives did not cut at different angles to improperly subconsciously
influence a victim or witness viewing photos in an array.60
But these factors provided fodder for legal challenge. The
Supreme Court had already ruled in 1968 that photographic
identifications obtained through procedures "so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification" would prohibit admission at trial. 61
Two later Supreme Court cases likely influenced the manner in which
the Baltimore Police Department conducted photographic lineups. 62
In Neil v. Biggers, a core issue was whether the identification
procedures used by the police were so suggestive as to violate due

60.
61.
62.

These problems were largely resolved in 1995 when the state run Central Booking
Intake Facility came online and took over all fmgerprinting and photographing.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
189-90 (1972).
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process. 63 In Biggers, the rape victim provided the police with a
description of her attacker. 64 Over a period of seven months she
viewed suspects through a variety of procedures, lineups, showups,
and more than 30 photographs. 65 The court held that the victim had
made no previous identification in viewing any of the other lineups
and had essentially established a track record of reliability that would
have negated the suggestiveness in the showup.66
In Manson v. Brathwaite, the identification of the suspect through a
single photo was called into question. 67 An undercover police officer
identified Brathwaite. 68 The Court supported the identification made
by the police officer (Jimmy Glover) but stated:
Of course, it would have been better had D'Onofrio
presented Glover with a photographic array including 'so far
as practicable .. _a reasonable number of persons similar to
any person then suspected whose likeness is included in the
array_' The use of that procedure would have enhanced the
force of the identification at trial and would have avoided
the risk that the evidence would be excluded as unreliable. 69
The Baltimore Police Department's primary effort in lineups
appears to have been concentrated on the composition of the
photographs and the construction of the array. The first Baltimore
Police Department General Order70 to address the issue of
photographic arrays-General Order 17-83-was published in
1983. 71 Procedures outlined in that order instructed the police officer
to assemble a group of not less than six photographs, including the
suspect, to be shown to the victim or witness.72 The first instruction
in the 1983 order stated:

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.

Neil, 409 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 201.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 103-04.
Id. at 99-101.
Id. at 116-17 (citation omitted).
General Orders, as used by the Baltimore Police Department, are policy and
procedural guidelines, published and communicated to sworn and civilian members,
established through best practices, legal precedent, or recommendations specific to the
Department.
Bait. Police Dep't General Order 17-83: Procedures for Viewing of Criminal Suspect
Photographs (Nov. 10, 1983).
Id.
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Members shall obtain a photograph of the suspect(s) which
is not over three years old, if possible, and a minimum of 5
additional fill in photographs. Members should ensure that
all photographs shall be of the same physical appearance
i.e., size, finish (glossy, matte, etc.), age, etc. When suspect
photographs are obtained from another jurisdiction, fill in
photographs shall also be obtained from that jurisdiction. 73
This instruction was meant to address the disparity and quality of
negatives and photographs within the Department.
General Order 17-83 also provided instruction related to the
manner in which the photos were to be presented to the victim or
witness. Section 1, subsection D directed that "[p ]hotographs shall
be shown to one victim/witness at a time. The victim/witness should
view the entire group of photographs even after a positive
identification is made. ,,74 Once an identification was made, the
victim/witness was instructed to sign and date the back of the
photograph, which was then submitted as evidence along with the
fillers used. 75
The order was especially significant in that it outlined procedures
that we now define as sequential photo lineups. Police officers were
required to prepare a supplemental report to the original offense
report that listed the photograph identified by the victim/witness and
"indicate [d] the sequential order in which the photographs were
shown ... [and] the position of the suspect.,,76
The order did not require officers to document the scope of an
identification made by a victim/witness viewing mug shots in the
Identification Section. There would have been no way for detectives
or prosecutors to determine if the witness had viewed a few
photographs or thousands. Furthermore, it would be impossible to
determine whether the other photographs viewed presented persons
with similar or dissimilar characteristics.
Section 3 of the order addressed concerns raised by the Supreme
Court's decision in Neil v. Biggers,17 by stating, "Photographic
identification may be used as probable cause evidence to effect an
arrest or obtain a warrant in a criminal case. However, there must be

73.
74.
76.

Id. at § leA).
Id. at § leD).
Jd. at § I(F), (G).
Id. at § I(E).

77.

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1972).

75.
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other corroborative evidence .... "78 The order stated, "Emphasis
should be placed on the totality of circumstances; duration of
witness/perpetrator
contact;
relationship
(if
any)
of
witness/perpetrator; and, credibility of the witness(es).,,79 General
Order 17-83 remained in effect until March of 1986. 80
It is not surprising that the procedures in the 1983 order mirrored
practices long employed by police officers and detectives operating
without specific guidelines. The order simplified the practices by
establishing a base number of photographs (6) to present to victims or
witnesses and essentially eliminated the single photo show. 81 There
is no indication that the Department applied any scientific method to
the manner in which the photographs were to be presented.
The second General Order on photographic array procedures,
General Order 10-86, followed many of the procedures established in
General Order 17-83, but included three critical elements that did not
exist in General Order 17-83. 82 The new order also indicated that the
Baltimore Police Department had shifted from using a sequential
method of presenting photographic lineups to a simultaneous
method. 83 The Responsibilities section, Item 4, directed police
officers to permanently affix the photographs to a newly created
photograph lineup form. 84 The order also provided that "[t]he
victim/witness should view the entire group of photographs on the
form even after a positive identification is made. ,,85 The final
direction was printed at the top of the new lineup form, and stated:
This group of photographs mayor may not contain a picture
of the person who committed the crime now being
investigated. Keep in mind that hair styles, beards and
moustaches may be easily changed. Also photographs may
not always depict the true complexion of a person- it may be
lighter or darker than shown in the photo. When you have
looked at all the photos, tell me whether or not you see the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

General Order 17-83, supra note 71, at § I(A).
Id. at § IlI(B).
See Bait. Police Dep't General Order 10-86: Procedures for Viewing Criminal Suspect
Photographs (Mar. 19, 1986).
See General Order 17-83, supra note 71, at § I(A).
See General Order 10-86, supra note 80.
Id.
Id. at § Responsibilities 4.
Id. at § Responsibilities 5.
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person who committed the crime.
Do not tell other
witnesses that you have or have not identified anyone. 86
In their work in the field of eyewitness identification, researchers
Gary L. Wells and Deah S. Quinlivan stated, "At its simplest level,
instructing the eyewitness that the culprit might not be in the lineup
can be thought of as a procedure to relieve pressure on the witness to
make a selection.,,87

IV. UNRELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
Since 1989, DNA evidence has been used to overturn more than
300 wrongful convictions across the country.88 Seventy-five percent
of these convictions were based on faulty eyewitness identifications. 89
The wrongful conviction of Kirk Bloodsworth, for the 1984 brutal
rape and murder of nine-year-old Dawn Hamilton, is perhaps the best
known example in Maryland. 90 Hamilton's body was found in a
wooded area in eastern Baltimore County. 91 Police officers and
detectives swarmed the area and soon identified and charged Kirk
Bloodsworth with the crime.92 Bloodsworth was convicted, in two
separate trials, largely based on the testimony of several eyewitnesses
that placed him in the area that day.93
The detectives used a variety of identification methods including a
composite. 94 Bloodsworth was identified in a photo lineup by a tenAnother young boy, aged seven, observed
year-old boy.95
86.

Id. at Annex A.

87.

Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures

and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light 0/ Eyewitness Science: 30 Years
Later, 33 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 1,6 (Feb. 27,2008), http://www.psychology.iastate.edul
-glwells/Wells_articles-'pdflManson_article_in_ LHB_ Wells. pdf.

88.

Know

the Cases:

Innocence Project Case Profiles,

INNOCENCE

PROJECT,

http://www.innocenceproject.orgiunderstandlEyewitness-Misidentification.php
visited Feb. 4,2013).

89.

90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Understanding

the Causes:

Witness

Misidentification,

INNOCENCE

(last

PROJECT,

http://www.innocenceproject.orgiunderstandlEyewitness-Misidentification.php (last
visited Feb. 4, 2013).
See Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23, 26-28, 543 A.2d 382, 384 (1987), cert.
denied, 313 Md. 688, 548 A.2d 128 (1988); Innocence Blog: 15 years o/freedom/or
Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.orgiContenti
15years_ofjreedom_for_Kirk_Bloodsworth.php (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
Bloodsworth, 76 Md. App. at 28, 543 A.2d at 384.
See id. at 28-30,543 A.2d at 384-86.
See id. at 27-30, 543 A.2d at 384-85.
Id. at 28-29, 543 A.2d at 384-85.
Id. at 28, 543 A.2d at 385.
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Bloodsworth in a live lineup but initially did not pick him OUt. 96 The
seven-year-old boy identified a filler in the lineup as the man he had
seen with the victim. 97 However, he later told his mother and then
detectives that he initially identified the wrong man because he was
afraid to identify the suspect (Bloodsworth) whom he observed in the
lineup.98 Prosecutors and detectives were certain that they had the
right man.
Nine years later, Kirk Bloodsworth became the first death row
inmate in the United States to be freed through DNA testing. 99
Evidence collected from the scene was exposed to DNA testing that
was not possible in 1984. Ultimately, the true killer was identified
through the post-conviction collection of the killer's DNA. 100 In
2004, he pled guilty to the crime and was sentenced to life in
prison. IOI Bloodsworth's widely-publicized release prompted a
groundswell of DNA exonerations as hundreds of convictions were
overturned using new DNA testing procedures. 102
While advancements in forensic sciences were revolutionizing
criminal investigations, particularly in cases of murder and rape,
debates raged on over the value of eyewitness identifications. Some
researchers began challenging the manner in which lineups were
presented to witnesses and the influences detectives could have on
witnesses while making suspect identifications. 103 Gary Wells and a
team of researchers began advocating for double-blind lineup
administration in order to prevent police officers from having
intentional or unintentional influence on eyewitness identification
procedures: "The dynamic interaction between the person
administering the lineup and the eyewitness, in conjunction with what
we know about interpersonal influence, necessitates that the
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

10!.

102.

103.

Id. at 28-29, 543 A.2d at 384-85.
Jd.
Jd. at 29, 543 A.2d at 385.
Kirk
Bloodsworth,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://innocenceproject.orgiContentlKirk_Bloodsworth.php (last visited Feb. 18,
2012).
Mary Chalupsky, From Death Row to Critic of Capital Punishment, LIFE AND DEATH
MATTERS (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.lifedeathmatters.coml2010/ll/from-death-rowto-critic-of-capital.html.
Id.; Specific Cases, MD. CITIZENS AGAJNST STATE EXECUTIONS, http://
www.mdcase.orgl node/39 (last visited Feb. 18,2013).
Facts
on
Post-Conviction
DNA
Exonerations,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.orgiContentIFacts_on_PostConviction_DNA_ Exonerati
ons.php (last visited Feb. 18,2013).
Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.orgl
understandlEyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Feb. 18,2013).
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administering agent not know which person in the lineup is the
suspect."I04 Wells also proposed that the lineup be videotaped:
"Videos are very limited in their visual scope, so there would have to
be one camera focused on the eyewitness, one on the agent
administering the lineup, and one on the lineup itself. In order to link
any nonverbal behaviors of the agent or the lineup members to the
reactions of the eyewitness, the cameras must be synchronized. In
addition, the audio portion of a video is routinely very poor when
nonprofessionals are making it.,,105
V. ARE DOUBLE-BLIND AND SEQUENTIAL LINEUP
PROCEDURES BETTER?
In October of 1999, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
published, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. 106
The guide, which was developed by a technical working group of law
enforcement
professionals,
outlined
best
practices
and
recommendations for procedures to use in conducting photographic
lineups.107 The introduction, authored by then Attorney General Janet
Reno,108 noted that cases based on eyewitness testimony are perhaps
not as definitive as once thought:

Recent cases in which DNA evidence has been used to
exonerate individuals convicted primarily on the basis of
eyewitness testimony have shown us that eyewitness
evidence is not infallible. Even the most honest and
objective people can make mistakes in recalling and
interpreting a witnessed event; it is the nature of human
memory. This issue has been at the heart of a growing body
of research in the field of eyewitness identification over the
past decade. 109
While the guide described the most commonly used methods of
identification, it made no specific recommendation to law
enforcement as to the value of one over the other. IIO Examining the
104. Gary L. Wells et aI., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 603,641-42 (1998).
105. Id. at 640-41.
106. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
(1999).
107. Id. at iii.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 27-28.
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Police Department's General Order in effect at the time of this NIl
publication revealed no significant deviation from the preparation and
presentation of the simultaneous photo lineup, including the witness
instructions prior to viewing the array. I II
Research prior to 2003 advocated for the double-blind sequential
method. 1I2 Researchers argued that the alternative type of lineup
presentations caused witnesses to use either relative or absolute
judgments. 1I3 In addressing the simultaneous photo array, Wells
reported, "There is good empirical evidence to indicate that
eyewitnesses tend to identify the person from the lineup who, in the
opinion of the eyewitness, looks most like the culprit relative to the
other members of the lineup.,,114 Describing the decision process of
witnesses in the context of a sequential lineup, on the other hand,
Wells wrote:
The eyewitness must decide at the time of each initial
presentation whether that lineup member is the culprit. ...
[A] sequential lineup would largely nullify the ability of
eyewitnesses to use a relative judgment strategy.
Specifically, although an eyewitness could reason that a
given lineup member (e.g., Number 3) was a relatively
better match to the culprit than was a previously presented
member (i.e., better than either Number 1 or Number 2), the
witness could not be certain that a subsequent lineup
member (yet to be viewed) would not prove to be an even
better match to the culprit than the one being currently
viewed. As a result, the eyewitness is forced to abandon the
relative judgment strategy and use a more "absolute"
strategy when confronted with a sequential presentation
procedure. 115

Ill.
112.

113.
114.
115.

Compare General Order 17-83, supra note 71, with NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra
note 106, at 27-38.
See Sheri H. Mecklenburg et aI., REp. TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE ST. OF ILL.: THE
ILL. PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCS. 3-4
(Mar.
17,
2006),
http://eyewitness.utep.eduIDocumentslIllinoisPilotStudyOn
EyewitnessID.pdf. The term "double-blind" in this context means that the identity of
the suspect is unknown to both the witness and the administrator. Id.
See GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK 81 (1988)
(explaining the distinction between relative judgment and absolute judgment).
See Wells, supra note 104, at 613, 616-17.
Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM.
PSYCHOL. 553, 561 (1993).
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The abundant logic in these findings was compelling; as
Commissioner, I contemplated how to design and implement a
double-blind system in Baltimore in a manner that effectively used
available resources. Finding detectives that were "blind" to a suspect
being investigated by their squad mates would be difficult.
In 2003, acting on recommendations from a panel on capital
punishment, the Illinois State Legislature commissioned a study to
test the effectiveness of double-blind, sequential photographic
identification. I 16 Both the academic and clinical fields raised
controversy between the two procedures (simultaneous and
sequential).117
Lawmakers believed questions about the most
effective method could only be answered through a formalized field
trial. 118 This field trial sidestepped the larger question of whether
police can be trusted to conduct photo arrays without corrupting the
witness. On April 20, 2006, the research team l19 presented their
findings at a conference hosted by Loyola University School of
Law. 120 At the time, I was Chief of Detectives and the results of this
study had a direct bearing on my recommendations for conducting
identification procedures within our Department. I was anxious to
learn how the three departments involved in the field trial (the
Chicago Police Department, the Joliet Police Department, and the
Evanston Police Department) had addressed logistical problems.
"[T]he Illinois data showed that the sequential, double-blind
lineups, when compared with the simultaneous method, produced a
higher rate of known false picks and a lower rate of 'suspect
picks. ",121 Interestingly, when using the double-blind, sequential
lineup, the "new" best practices, witnesses identified more of the
wrong people and fewer of the right people. 122 The study elaborated
on the failure of the double-blind sequential when shown to certain
116. See Mecklenburg, supra note at 112, 8-9.
117. See Zack L. Winzeler, Whoa, Whoa, Whoa ... One at a Time: Examining the Responses
to the Illinois Study on Double-Blind Sequential Lineup Procedures, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 1595, l604-{)5 (2008) (explaining the controversy between the two methods as
articulated by academia and law enforcement).
118. See id. at 1605.
119. Sheri Mecklenburg, Assistant United States Attorney in Chicago, was appointed
Program Director and author for the study by the Illinois State Police. Dr. Roy
Malpass of the University of Texas, El Paso, and Dr. Ebbe Ebbesen of the University
of California, San Diego, both well-recognized experts in the area of eyewitness
identification, contributed to the report. Mecklenburg, supra note 112, at 22-23.
120. See id. at vii.
121. /d.atv.
122. See id. at 45-47.

530

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

classes of victims and witnesses such as children, the elderly, and in
cases involving cross-racial identifications, multiple perpetrators, and
suspects who do not match the description because of a change in
appearance. 123 These were factors in thousands of cases in Baltimore
each year, forcing me to consider the ramifications of introducing a
procedure that would diminish our ability to identify offenders.
The study also addressed logistical difficulties that I had
anticipated. The difficulty in finding detectives who could administer
the arrays, especially in locations outside of police facilities, such as
hospitals, in residences, or on the street,124 was highly relevant to the
Baltimore Police Department. Furthermore, the "blind administrator"
was antithetical to the team framework of most investigative
squads. 125 These logistical problems caused delays in which contact
with victims and witnesses was lost or compromised, and in some
cases impeded the ability to charge the suspect in a timely fashion. 126
Especially in light of these findings, I remained confident that
Baltimore was using a sound identification procedure, one that could
be modified at the margins perhaps, but solid nonetheless.
The condemnations of the Chicago Field Study, which came to be
known as the Mecklenburg Report, came fast and furious.
Researchers asserted that there were gross errors and that the study
failed to follow basic scientific protocols. 127 In a scathing critique,
psychology professor and chairman of social sciences at Iowa State
University, Gary L. Wells, stated the report was a disappointment and
expressed concern that the design of the study did not permit any
clear conclusions. 128 Wells went on to note that the most significant
flaw in the study was the failure to use blind administrators in the
simultaneous lineups, essentially exposing those presentations to the
corrupting influence of police detectives.129 Specifically, Wells
charged:
It is important to recognize that the administration of a
photographic lineup is a "conversation" between the lineup
123. See id. at 7.
124. Id.at59.
125. See id. at 57 (discussing law enforcement's concerns with using a blind
administrator).
126. See id. at 58.
127. See Winzeler, supra note 117, at 1607 (explaining the criticism of the Mecklenburg
report).
128. See Gary L. Wells, Gary L. Wells' Comments on the Mecklenburg Report, IOWA ST.
UNIY. DEP'T OF PSYCHOL., http://www.psychology.iastate.edul-glwellslIllinois_
Project_ Wells_comments.pdf(last visited Feb. 18,2013).
129. See id.
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administrator and the eyewitness over a set of photos. The
interaction between the eyewitness and the lineup
administrator yields a product.
When the lineup
administrator knows the "correct" answer, the product
cannot be said to be purely the result of the eyewitness'
memory. 130
Professor Wells added the caveat that he was not alleging a
conscious effort on the part of the administrators (i.e., detectives) to
influence the witnesses' decisions. In closing, Professor Wells added
his strongest condemnation:
There is one claim in the Mecklenburg Report that I can
state unequivocally to be false, or at least terribly
misleading. Specifically, it is stated on page 32 that "The
protocols and forms, like the surveys, were viewed and
approved by Professors Malpass, Ebbesen, Wells and
Steblay." Although I did examine the survey, I had no input
to or knowledge of the design of the study. In fact, I was
shocked when I learned of the failure of the study to include
a double-blind control for the simultaneous lineups, a fact I
learned only when I read the final report. Nancy Steblay
clearly states that she too had no idea that this study would
have this design flaw. I have asked Sherri Mecklenburg to
correct this misperception, but no corrections have yet been
made as far as I am aware. 131
While the debate raged as to the legitimacy of the Mecklenburg
Report, it was clear that the concerns about police influence had not
been addressed or resolved. In November of 2007, the Baltimore
Police Department published General Order J-9: Photographic Array
Procedures. 132 The order changed language used in prior publications
in an effort to confront the charges of police influence in the outcome
of witness identification. The Policy Declaration of General Order J9 stated, in part, "The identification procedures shall be conducted in
a manner that promotes the reliability, fairness, and objectivity of the
witness' identification.,,133
In the very next section, General

130.

Id.

131. Id.
132. BaIt. Police Dep't General Order J-9: Photographic Array Procedures (Nov. 30,
2007).
133. Id.
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Infonnation, the order provided, "No member of the Department will
influence or attempt to influence the identification of a subject in the
showing of a photographic array.,,134 The Required Action section of
the order, Item 4.1, directed, "Explain to the individual that you are
going to show them a group of photographs. Avoid saying anything
to the witness that may influence the witness' selection.,,135 Item 4.2
specifically required the officer to read the statement that had been
printed on the photo identification fonn, essentially advising that the
array mayor may not contain a picture of the subject of the
investigation. 136 Additionally, the order directed the officer to have
the witness "note all comments as to the identification of the subject
in the Comments section of the fonn.,,13?
VI. THE FUTURE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Nearly twenty-five years after the publication of the first general
order on procedures for conducting photographic arrays, Baltimore
has continued to adapt its practices in light of developments in the
field of criminal identification, case law, technology, and best
practices. Gone are the Bertillon cabinets, lineup rooms, mug shot
cameras, hand cut negatives, and thousands of hand-typed index
cards. While much has been done, two lingering and perhaps
insuperable liabilities remain.
First are the failings of man. The Baltimore Police Department has
clearly demonstrated a commitment to the core recommendations and
best practices in the presentation of photographic arrays. The design
of the lineup, the unifonnity and content of the instructions to the
witness, and requiring a written post-identification statement are
consistent with the consensus derived from recent research.
Despite-and sometimes in spite of-the Department's best efforts,
police officers fail and make mistakes. While the Department was
rewriting the general order on photo array procedures, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was deciding the case
of United States v. Saunders. 138 The case involved unifonned
Baltimore patrol officers who apprehended two suspects (Rodney
Saunders and Tavon Walker) after they robbed a liquor store at
134. Id.
135. Id. at § 4.1.
136. See id. at § 4.2.
137. Id.

138. United States v. Saunders, 501 F.3d 384, 390-93 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding the sixphoto array shown to the witness was impermissibly suggestive but upholding the
defendant's conviction because witness's identification was not impermissibly tainted
by the suggestiveness).
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gunpoint. Saunders was captured as he attempted to flee in a
vehicle.139 At question in the case were the identification procedures
and the photographic array shown to the witness. 14o The court ruled
that the photo array was "impermissibly suggestive" and that the
lineup administrator failed to instruct the witness that the lineup may
or may not contain a photograph of the suspect. 141 Although this
procedure was well established within departmental policy,
sometimes police officers fail to adhere to the prescribed policy.
The second liability is more problematic. Police departments
constantly find themselves dealing with accusations of improper
influence and corruption. Although these accusations are sometimes
painfully true, law enforcement agencies go to great lengths to
prevent improper influence through training, accountability, and
oversight. While in any human organization corruption may exist,
we must acknowledge that the vast majority of police officers and
detectives are honest and follow the rules. They investigate their
cases in an ethical manner and use procedures that ensure equal
justice to victims and the accused. More to the point, most detectives
deliver photographic arrays using a simultaneous method without
influence or prejudice. Research conducted following the Chicago
Field Study, using computers to administer lineups, concluded that
the simultaneous procedure resulted in the identification of the
suspect in 25.5% of the cases and the sequential procedure resulted in
the identification of the suspect in 27.3% of the cases. 142 The false
identification rates were higher in simultaneous arrays, 18.1 %
compared to 12.2% in sequential arrays. 143
Notwithstanding these results, a sustainable solution cannot be to
rely solely on technology and the cold calculus of computers to
replace detectives just because of allegations of impropriety and
corruption. Technology has its role in the future of police workwhether it's red light cameras, dashboard cameras, or videotaped
interviews-but hardworking detectives of good faith should remain
the backbone of law enforcement. We understand the flaws in our
system, just as our predecessors did in nineteenth-century France, but
the justice system-from police and prosecutors to defendants and

139. ld. at 387-88.
140. See id. at 389.
141. ld. at 390-9l.
142. GARY L. WELLS, NANCY K. STEBLAY & JENNIFER E. DYSART, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'y,
A TEST OF THE SIMULTANEOUS VS. SEQUENTIAL LINEUP METHODS 5-6, 13 (2011).
143. ld. at 13.
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defense attorneys to judges and jurors-is a system of ordinary men
and women. And that is as it should be.

